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Economist Matthew Jackson insisted that direct democracy is the 
best way to access citizens' preferences, but that it is typically 
too costly for governments, which often turn to representatives 
to defray the high costs and act on behalf of a population. He 
proposed a model for assigning weights to representatives' votes 
that is “a second best” alternative to direct democracy. The 
model explores the effects of assigning weights to votes in order 
to find the most efficient vote allocation for a population whose 
preferences are potentially diverse and numerous, such as in the 
European Union (EU) or the United States. He asserted that the 
issue of allocating votes over heterogeneous preferences is 
especially salient given recent negotiations over the new 
constitution of the EU which assigns weights to the votes of 
representatives in the Council of Ministers.  
He explained, “In any democratic union where the member 
countries, states, or districts comprising the union may be of 
different sizes and have different compositions in terms of 
citizens' preferences, it makes sense to weight the votes of the 
representatives.”  
The establishment of a voting rule for the European Council of 
Ministers illustrates the importance of considering various 
methods of weighting votes, Jackson said. In the Council, each 
EU member country receives one representative to vote on 
policies affecting the EU. Since the countries range in size from 
half a million to over 80 million it is necessary to consider how 
votes will be weighted in accordance with the countries' ideas of 
fair representation, he explained.  
Jackson 's research addresses the question of fair representation 
by designing a voting rule that reflects citizens' preferences best. 
While a variety of different mechanisms already exist in theory 
and practice, as in the case of the EU, Jackson argues that they 
may not be the best ones for maximizing the overall welfare of a 
population. Many researchers and policymakers focus on the 
principal of equity when considering the weighting of votes, but 
he asserted that there are certain conditions under which 
proportional weights, often used in existing representative 
bodies, are not the best way to maximize citizens' preferences. 
He investigated utilitarian methods for weighting votes in order 
to capture citizens' preferences more optimally than assigning 
votes proportional to the size of the represented populations.  
Using the logic of social choice theory, Jackson demonstrated 
that using proportional weights for a population in which the 
distribution of preferences is very diverse can result in the wrong 
decision more often that using less-than-proportional weights. 
Using less-than-proportional weighting has “fewer chances of 
being wrong,” Jackson said.  
In addition to vote weights, thresholds that establish the 
percentage of affirmative votes required for passage of a policy 
also determine the structure of a voting rule. According to 
Jackson , the higher the threshold the less favorable the voting 
rule is to policy change.  
Jackson pointed to the Nice Treaty of 2000, which established the 
voting rule for the European Council of Ministers, as an example: 
the treaty required support of 74 percent of the votes cast to 
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 pass. But, said Jackson , such a threshold highly favors the 
status quo, making passage difficult. In contrast, Jackson said, 
the Constitutional Convention of 2003, which proposed a 
threshold of 60 percent to pass, was less favorable to the status 
quo. The structure of the vote weighting and the threshold 
together determine the outcome of the vote.  
A central part of Jackson 's theory asserts that every population 
can be subdivided into voting blocks. A large country may have a 
significantly heterogeneous population compared with a small 
country; therefore, the larger country would have a greater 
number of voting blocks. If this were the case, proportional 
weights better represent citizens' preferences in countries with 
highly heterogeneous voting blocks; however, if the number of 
voting blocks were the same across countries, the proportional 
weights model would fit best. According to Jackson , the pattern 
of citizens' preferences would determine the optimal set of 
weights.  
Jackson tested his theory using data collected from 
Eurobarometer surveys, which is poll data collected from EU 
member states. He found that EU countries are relatively 
homogenous in terms of the number voting blocks and that the 
proportional representation system proposed by the European 
Constitution represents citizens' preferences better than the less-
than-proportional voting structure of the Nice Treaty, which over 
represents some countries, while under representing others.  
Jackson 's research used the example of the European Council, 
but he showed that the model can be applied to any organization 
or government divided into districts, states, or countries 
composed of varied populations and preferences.  
In an ideal situation, taking referenda on all issues which concern 
citizens is the best way to realize preferences, but this method is 
too costly, says Jackson . Instead, policymakers can design 
democratic institutions to represent these preferences most 
optimally by better understanding the distribution of preferences 
among citizens. --Autumn Lockwood Payton  
Precis:Consider a voting procedure where countries, states, or districts 
comprising a union each elect representatives who then participate in later 
votes at the union level on their behalf. The countries, provinces, and states 
may vary in their populations and composition. If we wish to maximize the 
total expected utility of all agents in the union, how to weight the votes of the 
representatives of the different countries, states or districts at the union level? 
We provide a simple characterization of the efficient voting rule in terms of the 
weights assigned to different districts and the voting threshold (how large a 
qualified majority is needed to induce change versus the status quo). Next, in 
the context of a model of the correlation structure of agents preferences, we 
analyze how voting weights relate to the population size of a country. We then 
analyze the voting weights in Council of the European Union under the Nice 
Treaty and the recently approved constitution, and contrast them under 
different versions of our model, and compare them to the weights derived 
from poll data. Click here to read the paper on which this talk was based.  
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Synopsis: 
Economist Matthew Jackson insisted that direct democracy is the 
best way to access citizens' preferences, but that it is too costly 
for governments, which often turn to representatives to defray 
the high costs and act on behalf of a population. He proposed a 
model for assigning weights to representatives' votes that is “a 
second best” alternative to direct democracy. The model explores 
the effects of assigning weights to votes in order to find the most 
efficient vote allocation for a population whose preferences are 
potentially diverse and numerous, such as in the European Union 
(EU) or the United States. He asserted that the issue of allocating 
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votes over heterogeneous preferences is especially salient given 
recent negotiations over the new constitution of the EU which 
assigns weights to the votes of representatives in the Council of 
Ministers.  
He explained, “In any democratic union where the member 
countries, states, or districts comprising the union may be of 
different sizes and have different compositions in terms of 
citizens' preferences, it makes sense to weight the votes of the 
representatives.”  
The establishment of a voting rule for the European Council of 
Ministers illustrates the importance of considering various 
methods of weighting votes, Jackson said. In the Council, each 
EU member country receives one representative to vote on 
policies affecting the EU. Since the countries range in size from 
half a million to over 80 million it is necessary to consider how 
votes will be weighted in accordance with the countries' ideas of 
fair representation, he explained.  
Jackson 's research addresses the question of fair representation 
by designing a voting rule that reflects citizens' preferences best. 
While a variety of different mechanisms already exist in theory 
and practice, as in the case of the EU, Jackson argues that they 
may not be the best ones for maximizing the overall welfare of a 
population. Many researchers and policymakers focus on the 
principal of equity when considering the weighting of votes, but 
he asserted that there are certain conditions under which 
proportional weights, often used in existing representative 
bodies, are not the best way to maximize citizens' preferences. 
He investigated utilitarian methods for weighting votes in order 
to capture citizens' preferences more optimally than assigning 
votes proportional to the size of the represented populations.  
Using the logic of social choice theory, Jackson demonstrated 
that using proportional weights for a population in which the 
distribution of preferences is very diverse can result in the wrong 
decision more often that using less-than-proportional weights. 
Using less-than-proportional weighting has “fewer chances of 
being wrong,” Jackson said.  
In addition to vote weights, thresholds that establish the 
percentage of affirmative votes required for passage of a policy 
also determine the structure of a voting rule. According to 
Jackson , the higher the threshold the less favorable the voting 
rule is to policy change.  
Jackson pointed to the Nice Treaty of 2000, which established the 
voting rule for the European Council of Ministers, as an example: 
the treaty required support of 74 percent of the votes cast to 
pass. But, said Jackson , such a threshold highly favors the 
status quo, making passage difficult. In contrast, Jackson said, 
the Constitutional Convention of 2003, which proposed a 
threshold of 60 percent to pass, was less favorable to the status 
quo. Together, the structure of the vote weighting and the 
threshold, determine the outcome of the vote.  
A central part of Jackson 's theory asserts that every population 
can be subdivided into voting blocks. A large country may have a 
significantly heterogeneous population compared with a small 
country; therefore, the larger country would have a greater 
number of voting blocks. If this were the case, proportional 
weights better represent citizens' preferences in countries with 
highly heterogeneous voting blocks; however, if the number of 
voting blocks were the same across countries, the proportional 
weights model would fit best. According to Jackson , the pattern 
of citizens' preferences would determine the optimal set of 
weights.  
Jackson tested his theory using data collected from 
Eurobarometer surveys, which is poll data collected from EU 
member states. He found that EU countries are relatively 
homogenous in terms of the number voting blocks and that the 
proportional representation system proposed by the European 
Constitution represents citizens' preferences better than the less-
than-proportional voting structure of the Nice Treaty, which over 
represents some countries, while under representing others.  
Jackson 's research used the example of the European Council, 
but he showed that the model can be applied to any organization 
or government divided into districts, states, or countries 
composed of varied populations and preferences.  
In an ideal situation, taking referenda on all issues which concern 
citizens is the best way to realize preferences, but this method is 
too costly, says Jackson . Instead, policymakers can design 
democratic institutions to represent these preferences most 
optimally by better understanding the distribution of preferences 
among citizens. 
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